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Abstract 
Welfare economics, in the form of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, is at present 
internally inconsistent and ethically unappealing. We address these issues by proposing two 
ethical axioms: society prefers Pareto improvements and society values lives lived at a 
"standard" level of health and income equally. We show that there exists a unique social 
preference ordering satisfying these axioms. Welfare economics is reconstructed to produce 
rankings consistent with this social preference ordering. The result is that we should always 
measure willingness to pay in life years, not money units.  A standardized life year becomes an 
interpersonally comparable unit of value.  
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"the cost of a thing is the amount of what I will  
call life which is required to be exchanged for it" 
       Walden, David Henry Thoreau 
 
1. Introduction 
We take as given the axiom that society prefers Pareto improvements. If a project makes 
everyone better off we should accept it. This ensures efficiency but still leaves open the question 
of distribution – if a project makes some people better off and some worse off how should we 
evaluate it?  We need a second axiom to assess distributional effects. Our second axiom is that 
there exists a standard or "reference" endowment such that, if everyone had this endowment, 
society would value additional life years positively and equally for each person (though it may 
choose to apply a social rate of time preference to discount future life years).  If everyone has the 
reference endowment, including personal abilities, health status, income, and access to non-
traded goods, society is indifferent as to who gets an extra life year. Society need not value life 
years equally when people have different endowments.   
We show that these axioms generate a unique social preference ordering. This social 
preference ordering is shown to have all of the desirable properties we would like in a coherent 
social ranking, provided people value life. We can construct “life metric” utility by asking people 
what life span would be required, lived at the reference endowment, to make them indifferent 
between this and the state under consideration. Our social preference ordering can be represented 
by a utilitarian social welfare function made up of the sum of these individual “life metric” 
utilities.  
There is a common objection that valuing lives equally must violate the Pareto principle – 
we show this is not the case.  The argument is that if one person is willing to pay more for a life 
  1year than another we should “value” life more highly for the first and give them the life year, 
while potentially compensating the second to ensure both are better off.   When compensation is 
actually paid we have a Pareto improvement; our first axiom results in the Pareto improvement 
being socially preferred, even when the sum total of life years declines.  However, when 
compensation is not paid we face a purely distributional question; which person does society 
think deserves the extra life year more? Traditional cost-benefit analysis favors giving the life 
year to the person who is willing to pay more.  On the other hand, we assume that in this case 
society values the claims of each person to an extra life year equally, independently of their 
willingness to pay for life in money units.  
Our two axioms imply that we wish to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that 
is the sum of people’s individual utilities. The only unusual aspect of this utilitarian approach is 
that utility must be measured in life years. Valuing lives equally in our formulation does not 
make maximizing life years lived a social goal; rather, it makes life years, lived at the standard 
level of income and health, a measuring rod for utility and social welfare. It is more usual for 
economists to use money as a measuring rod. The choice of a measuring rod for utility has no 
effect on Pareto efficiency; if everyone is better off their utility goes up whatever the metric, but 
it does have significant consequences when we add over gains and losses to decide distributional 
issues.  
We use our social preference ordering to construct a new approach to welfare economics 
and project appraisal. If society is at the reference point, so that everyone has the reference point 
endowment, we get standard cost effectiveness for health interventions as currently practiced. 
The welfare gain of a project is the sum of life years gained. Away from the reference point the 
analysis changes however; life years gained must be quality adjusted, where the adjustment 
  2factor is the number of healthy life years at the reference endowment that would give the same 
utility gain as a life year in the current state. Our "quality adjusted" life years are therefore 
adjusted for the full utility flow from the life being extended, not just adjusted for health related 
disability. The adjustment depends on the individual’s preferences for a year of life in her current 
state versus life lived at the reference endowment.  
Cost benefit analysis undergoes a more substantial change under our social preference 
ordering.  When we are at the reference point, the net benefit is the sum of the willingness of 
people to pay for the project in life years. Away from the reference endowment the life years 
being paid must be quality adjusted to life years lived at the reference point based on individual 
preferences.  This “life-metric” approach tends to give more weight to the preferences to the poor 
than in standard “money metric” cost benefit analysis; a rich man may often be willing to pay 
more money than a poor man for a project, while not being willing to give up more life years.    
  Perhaps surprisingly, our two axioms completely determine society’s attitudes about 
inequality and tradeoffs between efficiency and equity. The fact that the social preference 
ordering satisfying the two axioms is unique is a very strong result. If our two axioms are 
accepted any two states can be socially ranked given information on individual preferences. For 
example, we can rank social states that have different levels of average income and income 
inequality. We show how social aversion to income inequality depends on individual preferences 
over money and life. We may also be averse to inequality in life spans.  Our social welfare 
function implies a trade off between gains in the average lifespan against the variance in life 
span, with the weight given to avoiding variance in lifetimes being the social rate of time 
preference.    
 
  32. Relationship to existing cost benefit and cost effectiveness analysis.   
Welfare economics is in a very unsatisfactory state. The criteria being used face a number of 
serious difficulties, both in terms of their ethical underpinnings and internal consistency. The 
predominant methodology in use is cost-benefit analysis, where a project is desirable if the sum 
of consumers’ willingness to pay (adding over gains and losses) for it is positive
1.  If the total 
willingness to pay summed over individuals who gain exceeds the cost we could potentially 
compensate to losers by lump sum money payments from the winners, leading to a Pareto 
improvement. If it results in an actual Pareto improvement, in which no one loses and some gain, 
there seems to be a strong ethical case for such a project.  However, without the compensation 
payments the ethical case for the cost-benefit criterion is much weaker; we have winners and 
losers and need to make a welfare argument that the gains of the winners outweigh the losses of 
the losers.  This can be justified if money is equally valuable to each person, so that money gains 
are equivalent to welfare gains, but it seems likely that the marginal utility money is lower for 
the rich than for the poor, making money an unsuitable metric for interpersonal comparisons of 
welfare (Boardway (1974), Sen (1977)). 
In terms of internal consistency, there is the problem that a project may meet the positive 
net willingness to pay criterion and be rated as socially desirable. However, having decided the 
project is to be carried out, the willingness to pay to stop the project may exceed the willingness 
to pay to keep it going.   Following the cost benefit rule, society will now decide not to have the 
project. In addition, even if refined to counter this problem, the rule fails to be transitive. Such 
inconsistencies in the social decision rule seem undesirable.      
                                                 
1 Formally, we can take this to be the compensating variation, the amount of money the agent could give up when 
the project occurs and be just as well off as before. 
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people's willingness, and ability, to pay. The ethical difficulties involved in cost-benefit analysis 
have led to the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (Weinstein and Stasson (1977)) in which the 
objective is to maximize total healthy life years produced with a fixed budget.  This assumes 
society values lives, or more precisely discounted, healthy life years, equally across people and 
wants to maximize the total number produced, independent of who gets them. While appealing, 
valuing lives, or life years, equally across people has some ethical difficulties of its own. In 
particular, it appears to rule out exchanges where one person gets extra health care, and lifespan, 
by paying another to forego care. This exchange may reduce total life produced but make both 
better off, if the buyer prefers the lifespan and the seller prefers the money received.   Always 
valuing lives equally is inconsistent with the Pareto principle that society should prefer 
allocations in which everyone is better off (Weinstein and Manning (1997)).   
In addition, cost effectiveness analysis is inconsistent with cost benefit analysis except 
under extreme assumptions on the nature of individual preferences (Johannesson (1995), Dolan 
and Edlin (2002)).  The use of these two inconsistent criteria makes it difficult to allocate 
resources coherently between the health sector and other sectors of the economy.  
The approach taken is this paper is to derive project evaluation criteria from axioms that 
represent ethical principles. The Pareto principle is a natural ethical criterion for social choice. 
Our second axiom comes from the principle that lives of different people should in some sense 
be valued equally by society, the principle that underlies cost-effectiveness analysis.  However 
we only assume this principle holds at one allocation on goods, when every one has the same 
“reference” endowment. This is clearly much weaker than valuing lives equally in all 
circumstances.  Ranking healthy lives equally at all times has been defended (e.g. Culyer 
  5(1989))
2. However it means that essentially we cannot judge between qualities of life. If we think 
of one person's life as better than another in some sense it seems reasonable that we should be 
more interested in saving the "better" life (Broome (1985),Broome (2002)).  More formally, it 
can be shown that always ranking lives equally implies that our social welfare function must 
simply be the sum of healthy life years lived, and that it is not affected in any way by the quality 
of lives lived (Hasmanand and Østerdal (2004)), which violates the Pareto principle. Valuing 
lives equally is only compatible with the Pareto principle if we limit severely the circumstances 
in which the rule is applied. 
We show that our two axioms, the Pareto principle and valuing lives equally at the 
reference endowment, generate a unique social preference ordering. This social preference 
ordering has most of the desirable properties we would like in a coherent social ranking. Our 
social preferences generate a continuous, reflexive and transitive partial order, overcoming the 
reversal problems in standard cost benefit analysis. It satisfies the Pareto principle, non-
dictatorship, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which Arrow (1950) has proposed 
as desirable properties for a social choice rule.  
The one weakness in our approach is incompleteness; there are a set of social states and 
individual preferences which our social preference ordering cannot rank. We need to assume that 
individuals always prefer more life to less, ruling out cases where people prefer a shorter 
lifespan, or are indifferent as to their lifespan. In addition, we cannot socially rank states that are 
so bad that individuals would strictly prefer never to have been born.  Nor can we rank states that 
are so good that they are preferred to living forever with the reference allocation.  Since Arrow 
(1950) shows that no social preference ordering, based only on individual preferences, can 
                                                 
2 While the life years of people at different incomes are ranked equally in cost effectiveness analysis, the life years 
of those with disabilities are given a lower weighting.  It seems inconsistent to give lower weights to the disabled 
and not the poor when the results of poverty may make lives as unpleasant as being disabled.    
  6satisfy his desirable properties if completeness is included, incompleteness appears to be a 
necessary weakness in our theory. While our social preference ordering is incomplete, there 
appears to be a wide range of circumstances in which it can be usefully applied. 
Our second axiom appears to be non-welfarist in the sense that it does not depend on 
individual preferences; society likes people to have longer life spans independent of what they 
themselves want.  However, limiting preferences to those where additional lifespan is desirable 
means that we do not have a conflict between individual preferences and social preferences. In 
particular, we avoid the result that non-welfarist social preferences necessarily violate the Pareto 
principle (Kaplow and Shavell (2001)).   
This approach to producing a well behaved social preference ordering, and social welfare 
function, by giving up completeness, has been examined by Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) and 
can be contrasted with the approach which maintains completeness but assumes the social 
planner has direct information in the form of a cardinal, interpersonally comparable, measure of 
each individual’s utility.  Sen (1977) and Blackorby, Donaldson et al. (1984) discuss the link 
between information available to the planner and the type of social preferences that can be 
derived. Our rankings depend only on individuals’ preference orderings, though our axioms 
allow us to generate from these preferences a cardinal, interpersonally comparable, utility 
measure for individuals with preferences from a restricted domain. 
  Somanathan (2006) has advocated measuring willingness to pay in life units, rather than 
in money units, when undertaking cost benefit analysis. However, we only use this measure 
when the allocation of endowments matches the reference point. When the current allocation of 
endowments is far away from the reference point the current life years people are willing to pay 
have to be adjusted to life years at the reference point, as is done for cost effectiveness analysis. 
  7We have to adjust each life year people are willing to pay for its quality, converting it to a 
volume of standardized (reference point) life years.    
The shift from a money-metric to a life-year metric for cost benefit analysis can be seen 
simply as an issue of choice of a numeraire, or unit of measurement. However, in cost benefit 
analysis the choice of numeraire has real effects (Berlage and Renard (1985)) because the 
numeraire becomes an interpersonally comparable unit of value.  While any good could in 
principle be chosen to fulfill this role, on ethical grounds we give a privileged place to life-years.   
Life, particularly healthy life, can be argued to have a special moral importance on the 
grounds that it is a prerequisite for the opportunity to carry out other activities (Daniels (2008)). 
We may therefore recognize a moral claim to healthy life without recognizing clams to other 
goods in the same way.  Rawls (1971) uses an index of primary goods to measure wellbeing for 
the purposes of distributive justice. This gives an objective measure of wellbeing independent of 
people preferences; we use healthy life years lived at the reference income level as such a 
measure. Life and health also have a privileged role in the capabilities approach to evaluating 
wellbeing on the grounds that they are essential to a having a reasonable opportunity set and 
freedom of choice (Sen (1985; 1999)).        
   Our approach gives a single method that can be applied to both the health sector and 
more general project appraisal. The lack of Pareto efficiency under standard cost effectiveness 
analysis often leads economists to argue that we should move towards cost benefit analysis in the 
analysis of health issues (Fuchs and Zeckhauser (1987)). Our resolution maintains the Pareto 
principle but leads to fairly minor changes in cost effectiveness analysis (life years gained must 
be adjusted for all factors that impact their quality, not just disability); instead it is cost benefit 
analysis that is required to undergo a major revision.  
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3. Individual Preferences 
We assume that there exist 3 types of commodities: traded goods, non-traded goods, and life 
span. We also assume that there is no uncertainty. An allocation for a consumer is a bundle 
(,,) x zl where 
G x R ∈ is the vector of consumption of the G traded goods, 
H zR ∈ is the vector of 
consumption of non-traded goods and  [0, ) l∈ ∞  is lifespan. We assume that the consumer has a 
complete, reflexive, transitive, and continuous preference relationship over the space of 
consumption bundles. There exists a continuous utility function U that represents these 
preferences, though any positive monotonic transformation of U also represents the same 
preferences.       
  Suppose the consumer is endowed with the bundle of goods  . The agent has a 




xpx p e p m = ≤= ∑ ∑  
There are prices  j p  for each traded good at which trades may be made.  We assume that all 
prices are positive.  We denote the “money” value of endowment at the price vector  
p by  .  Let  m F  denote the set of feasible consumption bundles. Let  X F denote the feasible set of 
traded goods. We make the following assumptions: 
 
A1. F  is a bounded, closed, and convex set in 
GH R RR
+ × × . 
A2. The set  X F  is bounded below in the sense that there exists some 
G x R ∈ with the property that 
X x Fx x ∈⇒ ≥l .   is bounded below by zero. 
A3. The utility function U is continuous. 
  9A4. The utility function U is strictly concave.   
A5. The agent’s utility function U is strictly increasing in at least one component of x.  The 
function U is strictly increasing in  .   l
 
Assumptions A3-A5 are much stronger than is required for our results. The continuity of the 
utility function assumed in A3 could be derived from a continuous preference ordering. Note that 
the utility function U can be changed by any positive monotonic transformation and still 
represent the same preference ordering. 
   Assumption 4 assures that given the budget constraint the consumption bundle of traded 
goods chosen is unique. Assumption 5 means that there is always a valuable tradable good and 
ensures that the agent's budget constraint is binding. Assumption 5 also implies that holding all 
else equal the agent strictly prefers a longer life span. The assumption that agents strictly prefer 
more life to less is implicitly an assumption that the vector of goods being consumed is above 
some minimal level which makes life worth living and puts a bound on how low  x can be.   The 
non-tradables may be goods or bads.   
Let us assume that that the agent faces (,,, ) p mzlwhere  p  is the price vector,   is his 
endowment of money (or the money value of an endowment of goods at the prices 
m
p ),  is an 
endowment of non traded goods and  is his lifespan. Consider the agent's optimal consumption 
of traded goods obtained through trade. This is given by:  
z
l
(,,, ) a r g m a x {(,, ) , }
x x pmzl Uxzl x F p x m =∈ ≤  
 
We can now define the indirect utility function: 
(, ,,) m a x {(,,) , }
x vpmzl Uxzl x Fp x m =∈ ≤  
 10Now let 
{( , , , ): ( , , ) } Sp m z l p x mx z l F =≤ ⇒ ∈  
Proposition 1  
(,,, ) vpmzl is continuous and strictly increasing in  on the set  .    l S
Proof in Appendix. 
 
A6. We limit the admissible allocation such that for all (,,) x zl F ∈ and (, we have, for 
some 
,, ) pmzl S ∈
l, 
(,,, 0 ) ( , , ) (,,, )
RR R RR R vp m z Uxzl vp m z l ≤≤  
(,,, 0 ) ( , , , ) (,,,
RR R RR R vp m z vpmzl vp m z l ≤≤ )  
This assumption limits the range of allocations we can consider.  The first inequality says that all 
allocations under consideration are at least as good as never being born. This rules out some 
allocations that are so bad that the agent would rather not exist. The second inequality rules out 
allocations that are better than an unbounded lifespan at the reference point.   
  We now examine the existence of a life metric utility function. The issues raised are 
similar to those for a money metric utility function (examined by Weymark (1985)).  
Define a reference point R  of endowments other than lifespan by (,,, . )
rr r p mz . We define the 
direct life metric utility function as  (,,) R x zl φ implicitly by 
(,,,( , , ) ) ( , , )
rr r
R vp m z xzl Uxzl φ =  
This is the lifespan lived at the reference point endowment that would give the same utility to the 
agent as the allocation (,,) x zl. We can define life metric indirect utility function by 
(,,, ) R pmzl ψ implicitly by  
 11( , , , (,,, ) ) (,,, )
rr r
R vp m z pmzl vpmzl ψ =  
This is the lifespan lived at the reference point endowment that would give the same utility to the 
agent as the endowment  . It is immediate that   (,,, ) pzml
(,,, ) ((,,, ) ,, ) RR pmzl xpmzl zl ψ φ =  
Further 
(,,, (,,, ) ) (,,, )
rr r rr r rr r
R v pmz pmzl v pmzl ψ =  
and hence, since v is strictly increasing in   we have for all l,  l
(,,, ) )
rr r
R p mzl l ψ =  
 
Proposition 2   (,,, ) R pmzl ψ exists, is unique and continuous over S. 
  (,,) R x zl φ exists, is unique and continuous over F. 
Proof in Appendix 
 
Our approach to constructing life metric utility replicates the approach used by Hammond (1994) 
to construct money metric utility.  The only difference between the two approaches is in the 
range of allocations covered by the metric. The money metric cannot measure utility in states 
that are preferable to an infinite quantity of money or are worse than having no money.  We 
cannot measure utility in the life metric in states that are preferable to any bounded lifespan or 





 124. Social Preferences    
We now consider a society with n people. The feasible set of consumption bundles and 
preferences of each person i are assumed to obey the model set out in section 2. Each person i 
has a utility function   and associated indirect utility function  .  i U i v
We wish to construct social preference orderings over resource endowments and 
allocations of goods. We use the symbol   for a weak social preference (as least as good as). 
Given these social preferences we can define strict social preface    and social indifference over 
states A and B by: 
 
A BA B a n d B A ⇔       
A BA B a n d B A ⇔ ∼     
The set (,  where  , ,) ii i pz ml ∈Γ 12 ... n SS S Γ =×× ×contains the admissible resource 
allocations for the society.   We also have social preferences over consumption bundles 
12 ( , , ) ... ii i n x ml F F F ∈Ω= × × × .  We assume society can also choose between a consumption 
bundle and a resource allocation. By considering the consumption bundles individuals choose 
given their endowment,  (,, ,) ii i i x pz ml , we have that a resource allocation generates a unique 
consumption bundle (by strict concavity of the utility function).   
  It is natural to think of social preferences as being over the consumption bundles that 
people actually consume. However, it is useful to also think of social preferences over 
endowments. If we undertake a policy to change someone's lifespan or access to a non-traded 
good, this changes their endowment and consumption of these goods. However, such policies 
can also affect the individual's optimal consumption bundle of traded goods and, in principle, we 
want to take into account these induced changes in our analysis.      
 
 13Definition: A social preference ordering  over (Γ, Ω) is well behaved if it is : 
(i) reflexive  
(ii) transitive 
(iii) continuous 
(iv)  complete 
and  
(v) (,   , ,) ((,, ,) ,,) ii i i ii ii i pz ml x pz ml zl ∼
(vi)( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l   if and only if ((,, ,) ,,)((' ,' ,' , ' ) ,' , ' ) i i i i i i i i ii ii x pz ml zl x p z m l z l    
 
Conditions (i)-(iv) are standard.  Conditions (v) and (vi) imply that a resource allocation can be 
identified with the consumption bundle it generates after agents trade.  An endowment A is 
preferred to resource allocation B if and only if the consumption bundle associated with A is 
preferred to the consumption bundle associated with B.  
These assumptions imply that we can consider social preferences over resource 
allocations as equivalent to the social preferences over the consumption bundles chosen by 
consumers with these endowments.  
 
Definition. A consumption bundle(,,) ii i x zlover n people is weakly Pareto superior to 
(' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl if and only if for each person i,  and for at least one person 
k,   
( , , ) ( ' , ' , ' ) iii i i i i i Uxzl Ux zl ≥
( , , ) ( ' , ' , ' ) kkk k k k k k Uxzl Ux zl >
 
Axiom 1  
If (,,) ii i x zl  is weakly Pareto superior to(' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl  then it is strictly socially preferred. 
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We now assume at some reference point lives are equally valuable. Let the reference point be 
(,,, . )
rr r R pmz = .  This gives each agent the same price vector, the same money endowment and 
the same endowment of non-traded goods. When the endowment of a variable is the same for 
every agent we do not subscript the variable with the person.  
 
Axiom 2 
There exists a reference point  (,,, . )
rr r R pmz =  at which lives are valued equally: 
(,,, )(,,, ) , 0 , 0
rr r rr r
ii i i i
ii
pmzl pmzl l l f o r l l i ′ ′′ ⇔ >≥ ∑∑   ≥  
This implies if everyone has the reference endowment we can derive the social preference as the 
sum of lifespans lived. Society is indifferent as to who gets an extra life year. Note that in this 
axiom we do not apply the principle that social preferences should depend on individual 
preferences. A utilitarian might argue that we should allocate extra units of life to those who 
would most enjoy it. Here we take the view that, given everyone has the same reference 
endowment, society does not wish to differentiate between people when it comes to allocating 
extra life years.  If there is a social rate of time preference we may wish to discount future life 
years relative to current life years – we analyze the implications of discounting future life years 
in section 6. 
  
Proposition 3. There exists a unique well-behaved social preference ordering on   that 
satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. This social preference ordering can be represented by the social 
welfare functions 
(, ) ΓΩ
(,, ,) ii i i
i
p zml ψ ∑ over Γ and  (,,) iii i
i
x zl φ ∑ over Ω where  i ψ  and  i φ  are the life 
 15metric indirect and direct utility functions respectively of person i given the reference point 
(,,, . )
rr r R pmz = .  
Proof in Appendix.   
 
The proof is based on the fact that the Pareto principle implies that if everyone is indifferent 
between two social states then society must be indifferent. To see this, suppose we have two 
states between which everyone is indifferent, but society strictly prefers one to the other. 
Consider convex combinations of the two states that are close to the state society thinks is worse. 
By strict concavity all agents are better off at these convex combinations, so by the Pareto 
principle they must be socially preferred to both the end points.  But now we have that one end 
point is socially strictly worse than the other but it has points arbitrarily close that are strictly 
socially better.  This violates continuity of the social preferences. 
  This means that society will be indifferent when we shift any allocation to an allocation 
at the reference point but with life spans adjusted to keep each individual just as well off as 
before. We can then compare any two allocations by shifting them to the reference point and 
valuing the different implied distributions of life spans through axiom 2. By transitivity of the 
social preferences, the unique ordering of the reference point allocations must be the same as the 
social ranking of the two original allocations.    
  It may seem odd that we can reconcile the Pareto Principle and valuing lives equally. 
Assume that we are at the reference point in terms of endowments.  Take the case where we have 
to choose between adding one year of life to person A’s lifespan and adding one and a half years 
to person B’s lifespan. Axiom 2, valuing lives equally, says we must give the life to person 2.  
However, suppose person A is willing to pay $100,000 dollars for his extra life year but B is only 
 16willing to pay $50,000 for her year and a half of life.  We can give person A a year of life and 
compensate person B with $75,000 say, making both better off. This Pareto dominates just 
giving extra life to B, is ranked higher on our social welfare function, and is socially preferred.  
These two decisions are not in conflict. Note that axiom 2 only applies when we are 
redistributing life among people holding everything else constant; when compensation is also 
being paid in the form of other goods axiom 2 is silent. In particular, axiom 2 does not imply 
society must prefer a year and a half of extra life to B over a year of extra life to A plus a transfer 
of $75,000 to B.  
  If no compensation is actually paid, a traditional cost benefit analysis would still rank 
giving a year of life to A higher than a year and a half of life to B, on the grounds that A has a 
higher willingness to pay. Giving a year of life to A maximizes social welfare in terms of total 
welfare produced measured in money units. Our social welfare function favors giving a year and 
a half of life to B because this maximizes welfare in a life metric. When we face distribution 
questions, the life metric and money metric approaches give different answers. However, when 
faced with an actual Pareto improvement each person is better off.  So the sum of individual 
utilities increases using either metric, and the Pareto improvement is always socially preferred. 
  Nothing in the proof hinges on the fact that the reference point is the same for each 
person. We can set different reference points for different people if we choose. There is a strong 
ethical argument that the reference point should be the same for each person.  However, a 
plausible alternative is to take the reference point to be the status quo at the start of the welfare 
analysis. Using the initial endowments as the reference point leads to a substantial simplification 
in implementation since we value current live spans equally and there is no need to adjust these 
to “standardized” life years lived at some other reference point.  The difficulty with taking the 
 17status quo as the reference point is that this can only be done once, after which the reference 
point is fixed.  As time passes decisions must be made based on this historical distribution of 
endowments which is problematic if it lacks a strong ethical basis.  In response to a change in the 
allocation of resources, changing the reference point to keep it at the current allocation is 
unsatisfactory since it is equivalent to choosing an entirely new social preference ordering, which 
not surprisingly can cause a reversal of social preferences over pairs of choices.   
     
5. A New Approach Cost Effectiveness and Cost Benefit Analysis  
We now sketch how cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis can be carried out so that 
projects are ranked in a manner consistent with the social ordering constructed in section 4.  In 
fact, both cost effectiveness and cost benefit are now conceptually very easy.  We have a social 
welfare function that represents our ordering. This is the sum of individual utilities measured in 
our "life metric."  These life metric utilities can be constructed through revealed preference; for 
any proposed allocation for a consumer, what lifespan at the reference point would make the 
consumer indifferent?  The project with the higher sum of life metric utilities should be ranked 
higher and is socially preferred.  We now show what this means in practice and how it differs 
from standard approaches.  
  We first consider cost effectiveness. Take a policy that redistributes lifespans. For 
example society has to choose between two medical interventions that give different life year 
gains to different groups of people. Let   be the net effect (either positive or negative) on the 
life span of person i from moving from intervention 1 to intervention 2. Suppose initially society 




ii i p mzl.  That is, at the resource allocation that holds before the 
 18policy is implemented, society is indifferent between who gets additional lifespan. The gain in 
social welfare form this policy, measured in the life metric at the reference point, is given by  
(,,, ) (,,, )
RR R R RR R R




p mzl h pmzl h ψψ +− = ∑∑ ∑
i
 
It follows that the change in the distribution of lifespans is socially preferred if and only if the 
total number of life years lived increases.  If we have two ways of spending a fixed sum of 
money on health care, the only effect of which is to change lifespans, leaving the other elements 
of the resource allocation constant, we should prefer the policy that generates more total life 
years.   
At the reference point we get our standard from of cost effectiveness.  However when the 
initial position is not the reference point the effect of change in lifespans is harder to analyze.  
The gain in welfare from a redistribution of lifespans is now  
(, ,, ) (, ,,) ii i i i ii i
ii
p mzl h p mzl ψψ +− ∑∑  
In general, this is not the life years gained by the policy but rather the sum of the lifespan 
increases at the reference point, which would give the same gain in utility.    
In general we can think of agents as consuming a vector of goods.  These goods can be 
indexed by time to represent consumption at different ages. To simplify matters for exposition 
we take a model where we have only one tradable good and one non-tradable good. This “good” 
can be interpreted as a fixed rate of consumption that occurs over the entire lifespan.  We assume 
that the non-tradable is a measure of health status.  For example it could be a scalar measure of 
disability. Further let us assume that the price of the tradable good is one. In addition the 
consumer has an endowment of the tradable goods (whatever lifespan is) of   . It follows that 
we have  and we can take the indirect utility function to be the direct utility 
function with the quantity of the tradable good consumed being  .  We can write the indirect 
m
( 1 , ,,) ( ,,) v mzl Umzl =
m
 19utility function of person i as   . Let us take as the reference point the allocation 
which is the same for all consumers.  It is normal in cost effectiveness analysis to take 
as the reference point the state in which a person is in good health; we do this as well, though it 
is not necessary.  As should be clear from our discussion of the reference point, setting the 
reference health standard at a lower level may affect social preferences. Let 
( , , ) ii i i Umzl
(,, .
RR mz)
l * ( , , ) ii i i i lm z φ = be 
the life span at the reference point which gives consumer i the same level of utility as ( ; 
this is just the life metric utility level.  This also has the property that  
, , ) ii i mzl
(,, * ) ( , , iR R i ii i i Umzl Umzl ) =  
It is useful to assume the utility function is differentiable so we can examine marginal rates of 
substitution and the effects of “small” changes in endowments.  Differentiating with respect to 





















to emphasize it is calculated at  rather than the 
point  . 
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Adding lifespan to a consumer increases his life metric utility. This gain depends on the gain in 
utility from the lifespan increase divided by the gain in utility from an increase in lifespan at the 
 20reference income and current utility equivalent lifespan. For small changes in lifespans  we 


























It follows that when giving a social ranking to life span increases, the life span increases of 
different people should be weighted differently, where the weight is number of life years at the 
reference point that give the same gain in utility as a life year at the current endowment (that is, 
the marginal rate of substitution between life years at the reference point and life years at the 
current endowment). 
  To make matters more concrete, suppose person i has the utility function 
(,, ) ( )
i
ii i i i i i Umzl lz m
α = , with 01 α << . In order to satisfy our axioms we require the money and 
non-traded good endowment of the agent always to be positive so that life is valuable.  The 
reference allocation is  which we assume and has the property that ( , so 
agents prefer being alive to being dead at the reference point. Utility measured in life years at the 
reference point is given by  in the implicit function:  . This implies 
that 
( , ,.) RR mz ) 0 RR zm >
*
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⎟  and social welfare is just the sum of these life metric utilities. 
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 21It follows that we weight gains to life span for richer, and healthier, people more heavily in our 
social welfare function.  Even though we value lives equally at the reference point, the Pareto 
principle makes us value lives unequally elsewhere.   
  Weighting life span changes equally across people in all states of the world violates 
Pareto efficiency. It appears if we want to maintain Pareto efficiency we have to weight people 
differently sometimes. Weighting different people differently, in terms of the social value of 
lifespan increases, raises many of the same objections used against cost benefit analysis as a 
method for allocating health care. However our outcome, while also unequal, is somewhat 
different.  Standard cost benefit analysis assesses benefits by the sum of the individuals’ 
willingness to pay for them. Given our utility function, the willingness to pay, in money units, 

















If variations in income are much larger than variations in lifespans this implies a much larger 
degree of disparity in weights on life span increases in standard cost-benefit than is used in our 
social ordering.  Note also what happens when  i α  is very small for one person.   
  We now turn to reconstructing cost benefit analysis to make it consistent with our social 
preference ordering.   The increase in social welfare from a change in the allocation of the non-
tradable   to an allocation   is :  i z 'i z
(, ,' ,) (, ,,) ii i i ii i
ii
i p mz l p mzl ψψ − ∑∑  
We can write the indirect utility function as   ( 1 , ,,) ( ,,) v mzl Umzl = .    Let us take as a reference 
point  .  Now setting  (1, , , )
rr r mzl * ( , , ) ii i i lm z i l ψ = we have 
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is the rate at which life 
years convert into "life metric" utility measured at the reference point, as in cost effectiveness 
analysis.  We now have  
*
(, ,' ,) (, ,,) (' )
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ii
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=1 and the social value of a project at the reference point is 
given by consumers’ willingness to pay measured in life units (their willingness to pay in money 
units divided by their money value of a life year).  Away from the reference point the life years 
 23the agent is willing to pay have to be adjusted to "life metric" utility, of equivalent life years 
measured at the reference point, as is done in cost effectiveness analysis  
To give a concrete example again let  (,, ) ( )
i
ii i i i i Umzl lm z
α = and take as the reference 
point the consumption ( .  Then the willingness to pay for the non-traded (the usual 
figure used in cost benefit calculations) is  

















































Note that while the rich are willing to pay more money for the non-traded good in this example 
they are not willing to give up more of their lifespan for it. Those willing to pay the most life 
years are those with long lives who have little of the non-traded good.  
  To derive our life metric social welfare we need to convert the willingness to pay in 
current life years to willingness to pay life years at the reference point.  The rate at which current 
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Using cost benefit analysis, and willingness to pay in money units, great weight is given to the 
preferences of the rich. Those who are willing to pay the most are the rich who have little of the 
non-traded good. However if we make people pay in life years, not money, the income level has 
no effect on willingness to pay.  While the rich and poor may be willing to pay the same in terms 
of life years in our social welfare function, we weight the life years of the rich more heavily 
since they are higher quality life years.  Note that the weight we use to convert a person’s life 
year to a life year at the reference point depends on that person’s own preferences of how much 
their current life year is worth relative to a reference point life year. 
  One of the standard arguments for cost benefit analysis is that it generates potential 
Pareto improvements. If we allocate non-traded goods using willingness to pay criteria, those 
who gain from the goods could potentially compensate the losers to get a Pareto improvement. 
This argument however does not imply that society prefers the allocation; total money metric 
losses may be smaller than total money metric gains, but we may weight the losses more heavily.  
It is important to note that if actual compensation is paid, and an actual Pareto improvement 
results, our new cost benefit criteria will always rank the Pareto improvement higher than the 
previous state.   
  We can generate something very similar to current cost benefit analysis if we assume 
money is equally valuable to each person and construct the money metric social welfare 
function, taking the current allocation as the reference point. We cannot shift the reference point 
as is usually done in existing cost benefit analysis when the situation changes, but this problem 
 25will only become apparent over time as we move away from the original endowment. The 
question of whether we prefer existing cost benefit or our new approach is essentially an ethical 
one.  Does society think additional money is equally valuable to each person at the current 
endowment, or does it think additional life years at the uniform reference endowment are equally 
valuable to each person?  
  
6. Inequality Aversion, the Reference Point and Discounting 
In our framework there will generally be social aversion to inequality in income. This will occur 
if the marginal utility of income declines faster than the marginal utility of life extension. In this 
case as a person grows richer additional units of income are equivalent to ever smaller extensions 
of life span. Since the social welfare is measured in life years, additional income for the rich is 
less socially valuable than additional income for the poor. 
  To illustrate this suppose we have the utility function 
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which is the same for each person i . This implies a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
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Suppose everyone has the same life span   and endowment of non-traded goods,  . 
Further assume for expositional purposes
3 that we have a continuum of agents normalized to size 
one so that social welfare can be written as 
l z
                                                 
3 Moving from a finite set of agents to an infinite set may cause problems with our approach since total social 
welfare may become infinite and comparing between infinities is non-trivial. However, the purpose of this section is 
expositional and we think of the integral as an approximation to social welfare per capita when the number of agents 
is large.  
 261 () km fm d m
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and  is the distribution of income. Suppose that income,  , has mean  () fm m µ  and a lognormal 
distribution with the standard deviation of  being  log( ) m σ . Then it is easy to show (using the 
moment generating function of the normal distribution) that social welfare is a strictly increasing 
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Society prefers higher average income levels but is worse off as income inequality increases. Our 
simple utility function gives a tradeoff between average income and inequality in income that 
depends on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, a measure of how fast the marginal utility of 
income is declining. How much society is willing to trade off average income for reduced 
inequality will in general depend on individual preferences and how fast the marginal utility of 
money declines relative to the marginal utility of lifespan gains for each person.  
While individual preferences determine society’s attitude to income inequality we have 
assumed that at the reference point the lives of each individual are weighted equally. This means 
that we care about the total life years lived at the reference point but are indifferent as to their 
distribution.  Society may want to discount future life years for individuals more than current life 
years. It is easy to reformulate axiom 2 to incorporate this.  
  Suppose everyone is born at the same time and we carry out our evaluation over social 
states at the beginning of life. Let an agent’s life span be lyears. The discounted life span, with 
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 27For δ = 0 the discounted life span is just  , the actual life span (by L'hopital's rule the discounted 
life span tends to l as 
l
0 δ → ).   
 
Axiom 2b  
Given the fixed discount rate 00 , ii and any l l δ 0 ′ >≥ ≥  
11
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We can now write the social welfare function as  
(,, ,) 1
(1 )





− − ∑  
Everything in section 2 goes through with this social welfare function instead of simply adding 
up the simple "life metric" utility gains.  It should be clear that in this formulation the choice of a 
social discount rate is an arbitrary social preference and is not linked to any discounting by 
individuals.  
  Our individual preferences do not assume that the same goods are being consumed over 
time, or the time separability of the utility function, so that the concept of individual time 
preference need not well defined (Becker and Mulligan (1997)).  However, if we impose 
restrictions that allow for the concept of individual time preference we find there is no necessary 
connection between individual time preferences and the social rate of time preference used to 
discount future life years. In cost benefit analysis, it is common to argue that to generate 
efficiency the social rate of time presence should be related to the market rate of interest or 
individuals’ rate of time preference.  In our framework this is not the case. Any social rate of 
time preference can be assumed while maintaining the Pareto principle.   
 28While the discounting of life years does not affect efficiency, it is related to social 
attitudes to inequality.  In our framework there is generally a social aversion to inequality in 
income because of declining willingness to pay for higher consumption by giving up life years as 
consumption rises.  
If there is no discounting of future life years, however, society is indifferent as to the 
distribution of life years across people with similar (reference point) endowments. With 
discounting, society prefers a more equal distribution of life years within cohorts; an extra life 
year for someone with a short life span comes before, and is more highly valued, than an extra  
life year for someone with a high lifespan. We show that if life spans are normally distributed, 
the social rate of time preference is equivalent to a coefficient of social inequality aversion on 
life spans.   
Suppose every individual has the reference allocation of traded and non traded goods. 
Again assuming a continuum of agents of mass one we can write social welfare as   
1
(1 ) ( )
l eg l d
δ l
δ
− − ∫  
where  is the distribution of life spans. We assume the distribution of life spans is normal 
with mean 
() gl
l µ  and standard deviation l σ . Of course this must be regarded as an approximation 
since life spans cannot be negative. In addition, while the distribution of adult life spans is uni-
modal (though skewed) there is also a peak in mortality and life spans between birth and age one 
which is not captured in a normal distribution.  
  However, taking the normal distribution as an approximation we then have (using the 
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 29Society prefers higher average life spans but dislikes variation is lifespan, the weight on 
inequality in the social welfare function increasing with the rate of social time preference. This 
analysis matches that of Edwards (2007) who argues that if people discount the future they will 
be risk-averse when offered gambles over life span.  Our approach differs in that it reflects the 
effect of social time preference on society’s attitudes to a distribution of life spans that are 
known with certainty. Note that in simple examples society’s preferences over income inequality 
depend on individuals’ preferences and their willingness to trade off income for life span, while 
society’s preferences over inequality in lifespan depend on the social rate of time preference. In 
more complex cases involving endowments that are not at the reference point, both individual 
preferences and the social rate of time preference will affect social attitudes to inequality.     
  
7. Conclusion 
Overall our approach gives quite similar project appraisal for the health sector as is used in 
current cost effectiveness analysis. At the reference point, which we can take to be a life lived in 
good health with a standard income level, all (discounted) life years gained are weighted equally. 
For people whose income or health is not at the reference point, life years gained are weighted by 
their own judgment of how many life years at the reference point would be equivalent.  This type 
of weighting is currently carried out using quality adjusted life years to adjust for different health 
states. Our results suggest that quality adjustment should be extended to all factors that affect the 
quality of life.   
  For non-health projects however, our project appraisal is quite different. Instead of using 
willingness to pay in money terms as a metric we use willingness to pay in life years; how much 
life would a person be willing to give up for the project? These life years are then adjusted for 
 30quality, as in our new cost effectiveness analysis, before being summed to give the total, quality 
adjusted, life year value of the project.  Our approach has the advantage of internal consistency. 
All projects can be ranked, and we avoid the reversals of ranking that occur in standard cost-
benefit analysis. In addition, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are coherent.  All 
measurements are now is quality-adjusted life years, and so we compare easily across sectors.   
The real argument is of course over the two axioms. It may well be possible to devise 
other sets of axioms that have the same internal consistency properties. Even if our axioms are 
accepted we have left open the choice of the reference point and the rate of social discounting of 
future life years. If these change, all our internal consistency results remain, but our social 
preference ordering, and ranking of projects change.      
  This shows the importance of the reference point. Once we value lives equally at one 
reference point and set the social rate of time preference we completely determine the social 
preference ordering. Shifting the reference point at which lives are valued equally will usually 
produce a completely new, and different, social preference ordering. Insisting that life years are 
equally valuable under two different distributions of income usually leads to a violation of the 
Pareto principle. Future research should examine how different choice of reference point affects 
social preferences. 
  We consider the welfare of a single cohort, of a fixed size, under certainty. This sidesteps 
difficult issues associated with intergenerational distribution, endogenous population numbers, 
and uncertainly. With cohorts at different birth years the social rate of time preference affects 
intergenerational distribution. It is unclear if this should be the same as the rate of time 
preference we use for choices between members of the same cohort.  Endogenous population 
 31numbers raise the issue of how we value potential lives relative to the actual lives of those who 
have been born. Our approach appears to do little to resolve this question. 
  While we do not allow for uncertainty, given the Pareto principle, assuming that 
individual and social preferences obey the axioms of expected utility theory implies a utilitarian 
social welfare function (Harsanyi (1955), Fishburn (1984)). Our approach also implies a 
utilitarian social welfare function, which gives some hope that widening the scope of the analysis 
to incorporate uncertainty may not lead to fundamental problems.  However, we leave these 




Proposition 1   is continuous and strictly increasing in  on the set  .    (,,, ) vpmzl l S
Proof. Continuity is straightforward. Note that the budget set for traded goods does not depend 
on the lifespan  .   Let  and denote the optimal feasible consumption bundle at  by  l n l →l l *( ) x l  
so that  .  Fix  (,,, ) (* ( ) ,, ) vpmzl Ux l zl = 0. ε >  
Suppose for infinitely many n we have  (,,,) (,,, ) n vpmzl vpmzl ε < − .  
Since the consumption set of traded goods is closed and bounded compact we can choose a 
subsequence  such that 
k n l *( ) n x l converges. Then since U is continuous we have  
lim ( , , , ) lim ( *( ), , ) lim ( *( ), , ) ( *( ), , ) ( , , , )
kk k k
kk k
nn n n nn n v p m z l U xl z l U xl z l U xl z l v p m z l
→∞ →∞ →∞ =≥ = =  
 This contradicts every point in the infinite sequence  being at least  (,,,) n vpmzl ε  below 
  (,,, ) . vpmzl
Now suppose that for infinitely many n we have  (,,,) (,,, ) n vpmzl vpmzl ε >+ . 
 32Again by compactness we can construct a converging subsequence  *( )
k n x l  converging to x′say 
.  Hence 
lim ( , , , ) lim ( *( ), , ) ( ', , ) ( *( ), , ) ( , , , )
kk k
kk
nn n nn vpmzl Ux l zl Ux zl Ux l zl vpmzl
→∞ →∞ == ≤ =  
which contradicts every point in the infinite sequence  being at least  (,,,) n vpmzl ε  above 
  (,,, ) . vpmzl
It follows that for any   0 ε > we have  (,,,) (,,, ) n vpmzl vpmzl ε − ≤  for all but finitely many nand 
it follows that   is continuous in l.    (,,, ) vpmzl
To see that indirect utility is strictly increasing in  , note that when lifespan increases the 
agent can feasibly consume the same set of communities as before, with a higher lifespan. Since 
utility is strictly increasing in    utility at this feasible bundle is strictly  higher than before. 
Optimal consumption must give at least as high a utility as this feasible consumption, and hence 




Proposition 2   (,,, ) R pmzl ψ exists, is unique and continuous.  
(,,) R x zl φ exists, is unique and continuous over F. 
proof. Given (,,, ) p mzl, then by assumption 6 
(,,, 0 ) ( , , , ) (,,, )
rr r rr r vp m z vpmzl vp m z l ≤≤  
Now consider the indirect utility function   as a function of lalone.  This function is 
continuous, and strictly increasing by proposition 1. Hence by implicit  value theorem for 
continuous functions (Jittorntrum (1978)) there exists a unique  such that 
(,,, )
rr r vp m z l
* l
(,,, * ) ( , , , )
rr r vp m z l vpmzl =  and  *( , , , R lp m z ) l ψ =  is continuous over  (,,, ) p mzl S ∈ . 
The proof for   (,,) R x zl φ is similar. 
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Proposition 3. There exists a unique well behaved social preference ordering on   that 
satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. This social preference ordering can be represented by the social 
welfare functions 
(, ) ΓΩ
(,, ,) ii i i
i
p zml ψ ∑ over Γ and  (,,) iii i
i
x zl φ ∑ over Ω where  i ψ  and  i φ  are the life 
metric indirect and direct utility functions respectively of person i given the reference point 
(,,, . )
rr r R pmz = .  
Proof.  We first address existence. Consider the social welfare function defined by  
(,, ,) ii i i
i
p zml ψ ∑ on Γand  (,,) iii i
i
x zl φ ∑ on Ω . This generates social preferences over states by 
taking weak preference if and only if the social welfare function gives a value that is at least as 
high as the alternative. By proposition 2 every resource allocation in Γ and consumption bundle 
in Ωcan be ranked by this function so the preference ordering is complete on ( , ). It is easy 
to see it is a reflexive and transitive social preference ordering since the ordering of the real 
numbers is reflexive and transitive. Proposition 2 also ensures that this social welfare function, 
and the associated social preferences, are continuous. Hence these social preferences satisfy 
conditions (i)-(iv). Now consider preferences over comparisons of resource endowments with 
consumption bundle. Conditions (v) and (vi) are satisfied immediately by the definitions of the 
direct and indirect life metric utility functions.   Hence this social preference ordering is well 
behaved. 
Γ Ω
This social ordering also satisfies the Pareto principle. Suppose  is weakly 
Pareto superior to (' . Then for every consumer i we have  
(,, ,) ii i pz ml
,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l
(,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i i i pz ml p z m l ψ ψ ≥ and for some consumer k we have 
(, , ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) kk k k k k k k pz m l p z m l ψ ψ > and hence  ( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ > ∑ ∑ so that weak 
 34Pareto improvements are ranked higher on our social order. Similar arguments apply to 
comparisons of consumption bundles, and our social preferences satisfy axiom 1.  
 
The social ordering also satisfies condition (vi), we value lives equally at the reference point. To 
see this, consider two allocations that have different lifespans at the reference point:  
(,,, ) , (,,,
RR R RR R
iii iii ) p mzh pmzh ′ .  We the have that  
(,,, ) (,,, )
RR R RR R
i iii i iii i i
ii i i
p mzh pmzh h h ψψ ′ ′ >⇔ ∑∑ ∑ > ∑  
 Hence an allocation of lifespans at the reference point ranks higher than on our social welfare 
function if and only if the total years of life gained is larger. It follows that the ranking generated 
by the social welfare function  (,, ,) ii i i
i
p zml ψ ∑  satisfies axiom 2. 
We now turn to uniqueness. Our social welfare function generates a well behaved social 
preference ordering satisfying the two axioms. Let us denote this social preference ordering as   
while   and  denote the induced strict preference and indifference relations. If this ordering is 
not unique there exists a second, different, well behaved social preference satisfying axioms one 
and two. Let us denote this ordering  as 
∼
  while  while and    ≈denote the induced strict 
preference and indifference relations.   
If the two orderings were the same we would have  
( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l   ⇔ (,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l    
Since they are different we can find two allocations such that 
( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l    while    (,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l  
or 
( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l ≺  while (,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l    
 35We begin with the case where ( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l    while    (,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l  
By construction of the preface ordering   we have  
( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ ≥ ∑∑  
and it follows by axiom 3 that  we must have 
(,,,( , ,, ) ) (,,,( ' , ' ,' , ' ) )
rr r r rr
ii i i i i i i p mz p zm l pzm pzml ψψ    
where, by construction  
(,,,( ,, , ) )
rr r
ii i i p mz p mzl ψ
i ∼ (,, ,) ii i pz ml  
(,,,( ' ,' , ' , ' ) )
rr r
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i ∼ (' ,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l   p mz pmzl ψ
Converting each expression to an allocation, let 
(,,) ((,, ,) ,,) i ii i ii ii x zl xpzml zl =  
(' ,' ,' ) (( ' ,' , ' ,' ) ,' ,' ) ii i i i i i i x zl x p zml zl =  
and  
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Hence we have, by conditions v and vi  
(,,) (' ,' , ' ) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
( ( *), , *) ( ( '*), , '*)
rr
Ri i Ri i x lz l x l z l    
while for all    i
(,,)( ( * ) , ,* )
r
ii i R i i i x zl x l zl ∼  
(' ,' ,' )( (' * ) , ,' * )
r
ii i R i i i x zl xl zl ∼  
 36Hence we have one allocation preferred to another. However when we move both  allocations to 
the reference point with different life spans, in such a way as to keep every agent indifferent, the 
social ranking is reversed.  Now consider the strict convex combination allocation for  
() a λ = (' ,' ,' ) ( 1 ) ( (' * ) , ,' * )
r
ii i R i i x zl xl zl λλ +−  
By A4 we have that  () a λ is Pareto superior to both  (' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl and (( ' * ) ,, ' * )
r
Ri i x lz l  
Hence  () (' ,' ,' ) () ii i a x z l and a λ λ    (( ' * ) ,, ' * )
r
Ri i x lz lfor 01 λ < < . 
Now by continuity of the social preference ordering taking limits as  0 λ → we have 
(0) ( ( '*), , '*) ( ' , ' , ' )
r
R iii i ax l z lx z l =   i  
Similarly taking limits as  1 λ →  
( 1 ) ( ', ', ') ( ( ' * ) , , ' * )
r
ii i R i i ax z l x l z l =    
It then follows that   
(( ' * ) ,, ' * )( ' , ' , ' )
r
R ii i i i x lz l x z l ≈  
Similarly we have that  
(,,)( ( * ) , ,* )
r
ii i R i i x zl x l zl ≈  
And hence  
( ' , ' , ' )(( ' * ) ,, ' * ) (( * ) ,, * )(,, )
rr
ii i R i i R i i i i i x zl xl zl xl zl xz l ≈≈    
by transitivity we have 
(,,)(' ,' , ' ) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
a contradiction with  
(,,) (' ,' , ' ) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
Now we turn to the case where   while  ( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l ≺ (,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l   . 
 37The argument is very similar to the previous case. By construction of the preface ordering   we 
have  
( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ < ∑∑  
and it follows by axiom 3 that we must have 
(,,,( , ,, ) )(,,,( ' , ' ,' , ' ) )
rr r r rr
ii i i i i i i p mz p zm l pzm pzml ψψ    
where by construction  
(,,,( ,, , ) )
rr r
ii i i p mz p mzl ψ
i ∼ (,, ,) ii i pz ml  
(,,,( ' ,' , ' , ' ) )
rr r
ii i i
i ∼ (' ,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l   p mz pmzl ψ
Converting each expression to an allocation let 
(,,) ((,, ,) ,,) i ii i ii ii x zl xpzml zl =  
(' ,' ,' ) (( ' ,' , ' ,' ) ,' ,' ) ii i i i i i i x zl x p zml zl =  
and  
( ( *), , *) ( ( , , , ( , , , )), , ( , , , )) * ( , , , )
rr r r r
R i i i i Ri i i i Ri i i i Ri i i x lz l x p m z p z m lz p z m l w h e r e l p z m l ψψ ψ ==  
( ( '*), , '*) ( ( , , , ( , ' , ' , ' )), , ( , ' , ' , ' )) '* ( , ' , ' , ' )
rr r r r
R i i ii R i ii i R i ii i R i ii x l z l xp m z pz m l z pz m l w h e r e l pz m l ψψ ψ ==  
Hence we have by conditions v and  vi  
(,,) (' ,' , ' ) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
(( * ) ,, * )(( ' * ) ,, ' * )
rr
Ri i Ri i x lz l x l z l    
while for all    i
(,,)( ( * ) , ,* )
r
ii i R i i i x zl x l zl ∼  
(' ,' ,' )( (' * ) , ,' * )
r
ii i R i i i x zl xl zl ∼  
 38Hence we have one allocation preferred to another. However when we move both  allocations to 
the reference point with different life spans, in such a way as to keep every agent indifferent, the 
social ranking is reversed.  Now consider the strict convex combination allocation for  
() a λ = (' ,' ,' ) ( 1 ) ( (' * ) , ,' * )
r
ii i R i i x zl xl zl λλ +−  
By A4 we have that  () a λ is Pareto superior to both  (' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl and (( ' * ) ,, ' * )
r
Ri i x lz l  
Hence  () (' ,' ,' ) () ii i a x z l and a λ λ    (( ' * ) ,, ' * )
r
Ri i x lz lfor 01 λ < < . 
Now by continuity of the social preference ordering taking limits as  0 λ → we have 
(0) ( ( '*), , '*) ( ' , ' , ' )
r
R iii i ax l z lx z l =   i  
Similarly taking limits as  1 λ →  
( 1 ) ( ', ', ') ( ( ' * ) , , ' * )
r
ii i R i i ax z l x l z l =    
It then follows that   
(( ' * ) ,, ' * )( ' , ' , ' )
r
R ii i i i x lz l x z l ≈  
Similarly we have that  
(,,)( ( * ) , ,* )
r
ii i R i i x zl x l zl ≈  
And hence  
( ' , ' , ' )(( ' * ) ,, ' * )(( * ) ,, * )(,, )
rr
ii i R i i R i i i i i x zl xl zl xl zl xz l ≈≈    
Hence since  is well behaved we have 
(,,) (' ,' , ' ) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
a contradiction with  
(,,) (' ,' , ' ) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
It follows that the well behaved social preference ordering satisfying axioms 1 and 2 is unique.  
 39  The fact that the social preference ordering can be represented by the social welfare 
function  (,, ,) ii i
i
i p zml ψ ∑ on  and  Γ (,,) iii i
i
x zl φ ∑ on Ωcomes directly from the constructive proof 
of the existence of the social preference ordering given above. 
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